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We tested the plausibility of a cognitive-emotional model to understand the effects of
messages framed in terms of gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss, and related to the health
consequences of red/processed meat consumption. A total of 544 Italian participants
reported their attitude toward reduced red/processed meat consumption and intention
to eat red/processed meat (time 1 questionnaire). One week later, participants were
randomly assigned to four different message conditions: (a) gain messages focused
on the positive health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; (b) non-loss
messages focused on the avoided negative health outcomes associated with low meat
consumption; (c) non-gain messages focused on the missed positive health outcomes
associated with high meat consumption; (d) loss messages focused on the negative
health outcomes associated with high meat consumption (message sending). After
reading the messages, participants answered a series of questions regarding their
emotional and cognitive reactions to the messages, their evaluation of the messages,
and again their attitude and intention toward red/processed meat consumption (time
2 questionnaire). Comparing different multivariate linear models under the Bayesian
approach, we selected the model with the highest plausibility conditioned to observed
data. In this model, message-induced fear influenced systematic processing, which in
turn positively influencedmessage evaluation and attitude, leading to reduced intention to
consume red/processed meat. Vice versa, message-induced anger reduced systematic
processing, which in turn negatively influenced message evaluation, and led to no effect
on attitude and intention. The comparison among message conditions showed that
gain and non-loss messages activated integrated emotional and cognitive processing
of the health recommendation, while loss and non-gain messages mainly activated
emotional shortcuts toward attitude and intention. Overall, these results advance our
comprehension of the effects of message framing on receivers’ attitudes and intentions.
Keywords: framing, message, meat consumption, message elaboration, emotion, message framing
HIGHLIGHTS
- Gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss messages have differential effects on attitudes and intentions.
- Message-induced fear enhances systematic processing and positive evaluation of the message.
- Message-induced anger reduces systematic processing and positive evaluation of the message.
- Gain and non-loss messages trigger integrated emotional and cognitive processing of
the message.
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- Gain and non-loss messages have a positive impact on future
attitude and intention.
- Loss and non-gain messages activate emotional shortcuts
toward attitude and intention.
INTRODUCTION
High consumption of red/processed meat has been recognized
as connected to the risk of developing various diseases, such as
cancer and type 2 diabetes (Misra et al., 2018; Bianchi et al., 2019).
For this reason, health authorities have recommended eating a
maximum of three servings per week (e.g., Bach-Faig et al., 2011).
However, many individuals still eat too much red/processed
meat (e.g., Farchi et al., 2017), due to the presence of several
individual barriers, such as habits or the lack of knowledge about
the nutritional value of plant-based diets (Stoll-Kleemann and
Schmidt, 2017).
In the domain of communication research, many scholars
have investigated how to overcome the aforementioned
psychological barriers, with message interventions focused on
health, environmental, and ethical issues connected to high
red/processed meat consumption (from now on RPMC) (e.g.,
Bertolotti et al., 2016; Carfora et al., 2019a,b; Stea and Pickering,
2019; Harguess et al., 2020). Only limited research has been
devoted to the effects on attitude and intentions of messages
framed in terms of the valence of the expected outcomes (i.e.,
in terms of gain, non-loss, non-gain, or loss; Di Massimo et al.,
2019; Carfora et al., 2020a). In addition, so far, no scholars have
considered the cognitive and emotional processing underlying
the effects of such message framing (Rothman and Baldwin,
2012). Providing more evidence on how to frame messages to
reduce RPMC and analyzing the factors through which message
framing influences people’s responses is therefore a substantial
research challenge.
Starting from the above, in the present study we investigated
the effects of message framing on attitudes and intentions
regarding RPMC relying on two main theoretical frameworks.
The first theoretical framework is the self-regulatory framework
(Higgins, 1997; Cesario et al., 2013), which makes assumptions
regarding the effectiveness of emphasizing positive or negative
outcomes in a persuasive message. The second theoretical
framework is the revised Elaboration Likelihood Model,
according to which the persuasive effect of a message is useful
to deepen people’s cognitive and emotional responses when
receiving a message (Petty and Briñol, 2015). The integration
of these theoretical frameworks helped in the understanding of
how to formulate messages on reduced RPMC and why they are
effective (or not) in changing attitude and intention.
Message Framing
Across an array of research traditions, past studies have
demonstrated that persuasive messages induce attitude change,
which in turn lead to intention and behavior change (e.g.,
Ajzen, 1991; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Wood, 2000; Petty and
Cacioppo, 2012; Petty and Briñol, 2015). Focusing on the content
or the construction of the message, researchers have also shown
that the persuasive effect of communication depends on how
message recommendations are framed (Davis, 1995; Chong
and Druckman, 2007; Spence and Pidgeon, 2010). Message
framing refers to the evidence that decision-makers respond
differently to different but objectively equivalent descriptions
of the same issue (Kühberger, 1998, p. 150), that is messages
stressing the positive or negative consequences of a behavior
(e.g., Rothman et al., 2006). A positively framedmessage presents
behavioral consequences with a positive valence. Conversely,
a negatively framed message presents behavioral consequences
with a negative valence. Framing the expected outcomes,
however, is not limited to the basic positive vs. negative valence
distinction. According to the self-regulatory framework proposed
by Cesario et al. (2013), both positively and negatively framed
messages can also be formulated by describing the presence or
absence of pleasure or pain. This level of framing refers to the so-
called outcome sensitivities level of message framing. According
to this distinction, positively framed messages can be further
diversified in messages focused on gain, when they describe
the presence of positive outcomes (e.g., If you eat well, you will
improve your health), or on non-loss when they focus on the
absence of negative outcomes (e.g., If you eat well, you will avoid
damaging your health). Likewise, negatively framedmessages can
be further diversified in messages focused on loss, when they
emphasize the presence of negative outcomes (e.g., If you eat
badly, you will damage your health) or non-gain, when they
inform about the absence of positive outcomes (e.g., If you eat
badly, you will miss the opportunity to improve your health).
Regarding the effectiveness of message framing, past
studies have shown that presenting the avoidance of negative
consequences can be more effective than presenting the
otherwise-equivalent gain, due to the “robust psychological
phenomenon” of negativity bias (Cacioppo and Gardner,
1999, p. 206), that is, the heightened impact of and sensitivity
to information on negative consequences. In other words,
non-loss-framed messages may tend to be more effective than
gain-framed messages (for a review, see Kühberger et al., 1999).
The negativity bias has been related to one of the main tenets of
bib47’s prospect theory (1979), i.e., loss aversion, according to
which people prefer avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent gains.
In consideration of the negativity bias and loss aversion, we
should also expect an advantage for loss messages as compared
to positively framed messages. In a meta-analysis about the
relationship between message framing and message processing,
O’Keefe and Jensen (2008) found that gain-framed messages
(i.e., messages phrased in terms of desirable states) were more
involving than loss-framed messages (i.e., messages phrased in
terms of undesirable states). However, the available cases did
not provide evidence concerning the distinction among loss
and non-loss messages. Consistent with this prior evidence,
in the case of messages focused on reducing RPMC, recent
studies (Di Massimo et al., 2019; Carfora et al., 2020b) showed
that loss-framed messages were the least persuasive, while
non-loss-framed messages, focused on the possibility of avoiding
the negative consequences related to high RPMC, were the most
persuasive messages, able to involve and persuade the majority
of receivers independent of their prior beliefs. One possible
explanation of the lower persuasiveness of loss messages as
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compared to non-loss messages is that the former might be more
likely to trigger strong negative emotions and, in turn, reactance
(Brehm and Brehm, 1981).
Even though message framing effects have been studied
extensively in communication advocating different types of
health behavior (e.g., Gallagher and Updegraff, 2012; Rothman
et al., 2020), most research on reducing RPMC has so far
ignored the distinction among gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss
messages. Recently, Di Massimo et al. (2019) and Carfora et al.
(2020b) indeed tested the effects of these four types of messages,
showing not only that they differentially influence attitude and
intention toward RPMC, but also that their influence varies
according to receivers’ baseline attitude, intention, perceived
efficacy, and subjective norm. To move further into the
comprehension of the factors that may underlie the different
effectiveness of the four types of messages, in the present study
we explored the reactions receivers have when they are exposed to
these messages, in terms of systematic and heuristic processing of
the messages, positive or negative emotional reactions triggered
by the messages, and message evaluation. We aimed to assess
the cognitive and emotional mechanisms underlying message
influence on attitude and intention toward reduced RPMC,
as well as possible differences in the role played by these
mechanisms according to message type. Below, the expected
cognitive and emotional mechanisms are discussed in detail.
Cognitive Processes Involved in Message
Evaluation
The higher or lower effectiveness of different ways of framing
messages depends on how these messages are processed (e.g.,
Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran, 2004), and message processing
can be usefully investigated referring to two classic dual-process
models of persuasion: the elaboration likelihood model (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic systematic model (Eagly
and Chaiken, 1993). The basic premise of these models is that
attitude and intention changes depend upon the likelihood that
an issue or argument will be positively evaluated by the receiver.
Message evaluation has a direct effect on receivers’ attitude and
intention toward the recommended behavior (e.g., Cauberghe
et al., 2009), and this effect has also been demonstrated when
the recommended behavior is the reduction of RPMC (Bertolotti
et al., 2020a,b). Message evaluation can therefore be considered
an important proximal determinant of the framing effect on
attitude and behavior change.
Message evaluation is strongly affected by systematic or
heuristic processing (Chaiken, 1980), that is, by differences in the
amount of cognitive effort an individual devotes to processing
and thinking about a message. Systematic processing implies
cognitive effort in considering the content of a message and
its relevance to a given attitude object, such as a behavior.
Heuristic processing is a type of shortcut that individuals use
when they are less motivated to or able to think carefully about
the message. When this is the case, individuals simply rely on
some non-message aspects of communication to decide whether
they agree or not with the message content. In the present
study, we considered receivers’ self-reported systematic message
processing as an important precursor of message evaluation. In
doing so we referred to the work of Smerecnik et al. (2012), who
developed a scale to quickly gauge whether people systematically
or heuristically process message information.
Emotional Processes Involved in Message
Evaluation
Although the classic dual-process models have produced decades
of convincing results, they have also been criticized for
undervaluing the role of emotions during message processing
and evaluation (Kitchen et al., 2014). Research focusing on
framing effects has also generally focused on theories mainly
designed to capture the “rational” processes of decision making,
overlooking the possibility that other discrete emotions, such as
fear or anger, might influence framing effects. However, several
scholars have shown a clear role of affective responses while
processing and evaluating a message (e.g., Gross and D’ambrosio,
2004; Dillard and Nabi, 2006; Peters et al., 2006; Kühne et al.,
2015).
One of the emotions that is more likely to influence the
processing and thus the evaluation of a message is fear. A long
history of research has led to the general conclusion thatmessages
inducing fear are more effective than those that do not (for
a meta-analysis, see De Hoog et al., 2007), also in relation to
attitude and intention change toward a variety of health-related
behaviors (for a meta-analysis, see Tannenbaum et al., 2015).
However, messages inducing fear have also been shown to be
counterproductive, and it is still not clear under which conditions
this is more likely to be the case (Popova, 2014). On the one hand,
fear can attract attention to the message and directly influence
information processing (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Messages
evoking fear lead people to rely on systematic processing, which
in turn stimulates many issue-relevant thoughts, and thus a
positive message evaluation (e.g., Meijnders et al., 2001; Slater
et al., 2002; Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran, 2004). On the other
hand, fear can induce people to enact defensive strategies to
reduce the potential emotional distress associated with the
message. For example, not focusing attention on the message,
or reinterpreting or disregarding its content (Witte, 1992; Ruiter
et al., 2001). However, so far, no research has considered how the
reactions to message-induced fear may be influenced by message
framing based on the self-regulatory framework.
Another emotion that is likely to influence the processing
and evaluation of a message is anger. Previous research showed
that persuasive messages framed with the appraisals of certainty,
control, and blame can trigger anger, and the intensity of felt
anger in turn determines processing ability and subsequent
behavioral intentions (Turner, 2007; Walter et al., 2019). Some
studies also showed that angry people are more inclined to recur
to accessible and relevant heuristics when processing information
that otherwise they would process analytically (Moons and
Mackie, 2007). In the case of persuasive messages, recipients are
often aware of the persuasive intent of the message and may feel
that the message threatens their freedom of opinion and action.
This feeling activates reactance aimed at the reestablishment of
the threatened freedom, leading recipients to react with anger,
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counterarguments, as well as attitudes and behavior that run
counter to the message intent (Dillard and Shen, 2005; Rains,
2013). To the best of our knowledge, however, no research
has analyzed how exposure to message framing based on the
self-regulatory framework induces anger in recipients, in turn
influencing message processing and evaluation. In the present
study, we investigated whether this would be the case and
whether anger would play a role in influencing attitude and
intention change toward RPMC.
The Present Study
Based on the above literature, in the present study we proposed
and tested a composite theoretical model to understand the
cognitive and emotional mechanisms activated by message
exposure in the case of gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss
messages on RPMC reduction. Our starting point was the model
proposed and tested by Di Massimo et al. (2019) and Carfora
et al. (2020b), in which baseline attitude, baseline intention, and
message evaluation were key predictors of attitude and future
intention to engage in RMPC, although differently according to
the same four message conditions.
In the present study, we aimed at further assessing the
processes that underlie message persuasiveness and framing
effects. We expected that a model considering both cognitive
and emotional dimensions would best explain receivers’ message
evaluation, attitude, and intention after reading the messages. To
test this expectation we compared the fit of different models: (a) a
model in which we considered the relationships between baseline
attitude and intention toward RPMC and message evaluation,
and in turn, the relationships between message evaluation and
receivers’ attitude and intention toward RPMC after reading the
messages; (b) a pure cognitive model in which we considered the
possible mediating role of systematic and heuristic processing;
(c) a pure emotional model in which we considered the possible
mediating role of message-induced fear and message-induced
anger; and (d) an integrated cognitive-emotional model in which
we considered both the cognitive (systematic and heuristic
processing) and the emotional dimensions (message-induced
fear and anger) as predictors of message evaluation, attitude,
and intention.
In consideration of what was discussed in the introduction, we
expected that the last and integratedmodel would be the one with
the highest plausibility conditioned to observed data. This model
is illustrated in Figure 1. Based on the literature discussed above,
we tested these main hypotheses:
1) message-induced fear positively influences systematic
processing (hypothesis 1a, H1a) and message evaluation
(hypothesis 1b, H1b);
2) message-induced anger positively influences heuristic
processing (hypothesis 2a, H2a), and negatively influences
both systematic processing (hypothesis 2b, H2b) and message
evaluation (hypothesis 2c, H2c);
3) systematic processing positively influences message
evaluation (hypothesis 3, H3);
4) heuristic processing negatively influences message evaluation
(hypothesis 4, H4);
5) a more positive evaluation of the message leads to higher
attitude toward reduced RPMC (hypothesis 5, H5);
6) a more positive attitude toward reduced RPMC leads to lower
intention to eat red/processed meat (hypothesis 6, H6).
In the model, possible additional direct relationships among
study variables are also controlled for. They include the influence
of baseline (i.e., at time 1, T1) attitude and intention on
all study variables after exposure to the messages (i.e., at
time 2, T2). They also include direct relationships among
the hypothesized predictors of message evaluation (systematic
processing, heuristic processing, message-induced fear, and
message-induced anger), and attitude and intention on the other.
Finally, the direct effect of message-induced fear on heuristic
processing is also controlled for.
A further aim of our study was to assess whether the
hypothesized relations between variables would occur in all
message conditions (gain, non-loss, non-gain, loss), and if so
with what intensity. Given that literature on the cognitive and
emotional processes involved in the four different types of
framing effects is scarce, we did not make specific hypotheses in
this regard, but only a series of research questions.
How far does message-induced fear influence systematic
processing (research question 1a, RQ1a) and message
evaluation (research question 1b, RQ1b) in the four different
message conditions?
How far does message-induced anger negatively influence
systematic processing (research question 2a, RQ2a) and message
evaluation in the four message conditions (research question
2b, RQ2b)?
How far does systematic processing influence message
evaluation in the four different message conditions (research
question 3, RQ3)?
How far does heuristic processing influence message
evaluation in the four different message conditions (research
question 4, RQ4)?
How far does a more positive evaluation of the message lead
to greater attitude toward reduced RPMC in the four message
conditions (research question 5, RQ5)?
How far does a more positive attitude toward reduced RPMC
lead to lower intention to eat red/processed meat in the four
message conditions (research question 6, RQ6)?
METHOD
Participants
A number of Italian citizens were invited to participate in
a university study on public communication. People received
an email with a link to an online questionnaire developed
through the Qualtrics platform (time 1—T1). One week after
the completion of the questionnaire, again through the Qualtrics
platform, participants were automatically and randomly assigned
to four different conditions (gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss
messages) in the ratio 1:1:1:1 and were invited to read eight
messages on the health consequences of eating red/processed
meat. After reading the messages, participants were required to
fill in a second questionnaire (time 2—T2). The initial sample
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FIGURE 1 | A cognitive-emotional model to explain message framing effects. Gray lines represent additional paths considered in the model.
was made of N = 834 participants. Since the aim of the present
study was to explore research questions and not to test specific
hypotheses, we did not perform a power analysis to estimate
the sample size (Amrhein et al., 2019). Participants who already
ate <3 portions of red and processed meat per week (N =
96), participants who followed a specific diet (i.e., veganism,
vegetarianism, or restrictive diets, N = 124), and participants
who did not fully or accurately complete both questionnaires
(N = 70) were then excluded. So, the final sample consisted
of 544 participants, precisely 257 males and 288 females with
an age ranging from 18 to 70 years (mean age = 39.97, SD =
14.78). In total, 9.8% of the participants had a primary level of
education, 41.2% had a secondary level of education, 47.7% had
a higher level of education, and the remaining 1.3% preferred
not to declare. In addition, 38.9% of the participants were
unmarried, 41.20% were married, 8.80% lived together, 6% were
separated or divorced, 0.30% were widows, and the remaining
4.8% preferred not to declare their civil status. Participants were
randomly distributed in the four message conditions as follows:
gain message condition N = 134; non-loss message condition
N = 134; loss message condition N = 141; non-gain message
condition N = 135.
Pre-test Measures
At the beginning of the first questionnaire participants reported
their age, gender, education, and typical diet (e.g., veganism,
vegetarianism or restrictive diets). Then, they read a definition
of “red/processed meat consumption” (“red/processed meat is
defined as mammalianmeat, that is red when it is raw and dark in
color when cooked. This includes beef, lamb, pork, venison, and
goat, and processed meat, like beef burgers, bacon, sausages, etc.
One serving is roughly the same size as a deck of cards, that is, at
least two servings of vegetables per day”). After that, participants
responded to a series of questions aimed at measuring their
baseline attitude and intention toward RPMC.
Attitude toward reduced RPMC was measured using a
semantic differential scale ranging from “1” to “7” (e.g., “eating
little red/processed meat is. . . bad—good”; Carfora et al., 2017).
Higher values indicated amore positive attitude toward a reduced
red/processed meat consumption. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.91.
Intention toward RPMC was assessed with three items on a
seven-point Likert scale (e.g., “In the next month, how often do
you intend to eat red/processed meat?”; never (1)—every day (7);
Carfora et al., 2017). Higher scores indicated a greater intention
to eat little red/processed meat. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.97.
Message Intervention
One week after completing the first questionnaire all participants
were invited to read eight messages (∼14 words each) describing
the health consequences of eating red/processed meat, and
formulated in prefactual terms (“if only. . . ”; see Carfora et al.,
2019a,b). Participants read different messages according to
the experimental condition to which they had been randomly
assigned. Participants in the gainmessage condition readmessages
on the positive health outcomes associated to little RPMC (e.g.,
“If you eat little red meat and cold cuts, you will improve the
health of your stomach”). Participants in the non-loss message
condition read messages informing about how eating little
red/processed meat is connected to preventing negative health
outcomes (e.g., “If you eat little red meat and cold cuts, you
will avoid damaging the health of your stomach”). Participants in
the non-gain message condition read messages emphasizing how
eating excessive red/processed meat is related to missing out on
positive health consequences (e.g., “If you eat a lot of red meat
and cold cuts, you will miss the chance to improve the health of
your stomach”). Finally, participants in the loss message condition
read messages about the negative health outcomes of eating too
much red/processed meat (e.g., “If you eat too much red meat
and cold cuts, you will damage the health of your stomach”). The
full list of messages is reported in Appendix 1.
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Post-test Measures
After reading the messages, participants were administered
a questionnaire aimed at measuring the dimensions
described below.
Systematic processing was measured with five items, asking
participants to state how deeply they had processed the
information presented in the messages (e.g., “I tried to think
about the importance of the information for my daily life”;
adapted from Smerecnik et al., 2012). Answers were given
on a 7-point Likert scale, from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7)
“strongly agree.” Higher values indicated a deeper processing of
the messages. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.87.
Heuristic processing was measured with five items, asking
participants to state how superficially they processed the
information presented in the messages (e.g., “While reading
the messages I did not think about the arguments presented”;
adapted from Smerecnik et al., 2012). Answers were given on a
7-point Likert scale, from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly
agree.” Higher values indicated higher heuristic processing of the
messages. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.70.
Message-induced fear was measured with six items pertaining
to the degree to which reading messages had made participants
feel fearful (e.g., “To what extent when reading these messages
did you feel scared?”; adapted from Brown and Smith, 2007).
Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale, from (1) “not at all”
to (7) “completely.” Higher values indicated a higher participant’s
fear after reading the messages. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.91.
Message-induced anger was measured with three items related
to how irritated the receivers felt after reading the messages
(e.g., “To what extent when reading these messages did you
feel irritated?”; adapted from Brown and Smith, 2007). Answers
were given on a 7-point Likert scale, from (1) “not at all” to (7)
“completely.” Higher values indicated a higher participant’s anger
after reading the messages. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.80.
Message evaluation was measured with six items asking
participants to state how involved they had been in the messages
(e.g., “The message was very interesting”; adapted from Godinho
et al., 2016). Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale,
from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree.” Higher
values indicated a higher participant’s positive evaluation of the
messages. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90.
Finally, we measured receivers’ attitude toward reduced
RPMC and intention to eat red/processed meat after the message
exposure, with the same scale used at time 1. Cronbach’s alpha
was 0.99 for attitude and 0.78 for intention.
Data Analysis
We adopted a fully Bayesian approach (Kruschke and Liddell,
2017) and all analyses were performed with the R software and
programming language (R Development Core Team, 2016), with
the rstan (Carpenter et al., 2017; Stan Development Team, 2018)
and blavaan (Merkle and Rosseel, 2015) packages. Following a
model selection approach (Burnham and Anderson, 2003; Fox,
2015), we first compared a series of multivariate models, to
test our hypotheses and to assess which model would have the
best plausibility conditioned to the observed data. Following the
rationale exposed in the introduction and summarized in “the
present study” section above, we considered and compared the
following models.
• Model 0 (M0), a null model assuming no co-variances amongst
the observed variables.
• Model 1 (M1), a baseline model estimating the association
between attitude and intention at T1 and message evaluation,
attitude, and intention at T2.
• Model 2 (M2), testing the associations of M1 plus those related
to systematic and heuristic processing.
• Model 3 (M3), testing the associations of M1 plus those related
to message-induced fear and message-induced anger.
• Model 4 (M4), testing the associations among all considered
variables (Figure 1).
In each model, parameters were simultaneously estimated by
using a multigroup approach considering the four different
message conditions (gain, non-loss, non-gain, loss).
To select the best model, we considered the leave-one-
out cross-validation information criterion (LOOIC) (Vehtari
et al., 2017), where lower values suggest a better fit to the
data, and Akaike weights, which represent an estimate of the
probability that the model will make the best prediction in new
data conditional upon the set of models considered (Burnham
and Anderson, 2003; Wagenmakers and Farrell, 2004). Each
model was fitted using the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo estimation method based on 4,000 iterations in four
chains considering 8,000 post-warmup draws. Convergence was
assessed by examining the potential scale reduction factor (PSRF)
(Gelman and Rubin, 1992). By adopting a model comparison
approach, we were able to estimate which model would provide
the best explanation of the data.
After identifying the best model, we investigated the
relationships among variables in each message condition. To
do so, we analyzed parameter posterior distributions and
summarized these distributions using posterior means and 90%
highest posterior density intervals (HPDI) (Tiao and Box, 1973;
Kruschke, 2011). Differently from confidence intervals in the
frequentist approach, HPDI provides a direct representation of
the most credible values of the estimated parameter (coefficient
regression in the current study) after accounting for prior
believes. A 90% HPDI represents the narrowest interval
containing 90% of posterior samples. When HPDI does not
include 0 (or it only contains a small proportion of values that
are close to zero), it is reasonable to conclude that 0 is not a




Table 1 reports the goodness of fit indices of the four models
tested and the null model. Consistent with our expectation, in
Model 2 the addition of the systematic and heuristic processing
of the message to the basic Model 1 increased the model capacity
to predict participants’ attitude and intention toward RPMC.
Similarly, in Model 3 the addition of message-induced fear and
anger to the basic Model 1 increased the goodness of fit, and the
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TABLE 1 | Model comparison results.
LOOIC se.LOOIC W
M4 9980.91 121.93 1.00
M3 10171.51 122.01 0.00
M2 10372.05 124.94 0.00
M1 10545.82 126.38 0.00
M0 14368.72 147.68 0.00
LOOIC, leave-one-out cross-validation information criterion (Vehtari et al., 2017);
se.LOOIC, standard error; W, Akaike weight.
increment was higher when compared to the one from Model 1
to Model 2. Finally, the cognitive-emotional model including all
considered variables (i.e., Model 4) was the best model to predict
participants’ attitude and intention after message exposure. This
model had the lowest LOOIC and the highest model weight
and offered support to our six research hypotheses (H1—H6)
regarding the relations among message-induced fear and anger,
systematic processing, message evaluation, and attitude toward
reduced RPMC.
Comparison Among Message Conditions
After selecting Model 4 as the best model, we analyzed the
parameter estimates of the model in the four message conditions
(gain, non-loss, non-gain, loss). All parameter estimates are
reported in Appendix 2. Below we will consider the predictors
of all endogenous dimensions, but we will focus our comments
especially on the cognitive and emotional predictors related
to our six main research questions, namely, how message-
induced fear predicted systematic processing (H1a; see section
Systematic Processing) and message evaluation (H1b; see section
Message Evaluation), how message-induced anger predicted
heuristic processing (H2a; see section Heuristic Processing),
systematic processing (H2b; see section Systematic Processing),
and message evaluation (H2c; see section Message Evaluation),
how systematic processing predicted message evaluation (H3; see
section Message Evaluation), how heuristic processing predicted
message evaluation (H4; see section Message Evaluation), how
message evaluation was related to attitude toward reduced RPMC
(H5; see section Attitude Toward Reduced RPMC at T2), and
finally how attitude toward reduced RPMC was related to
intention to eat red/processed meat (H6; see section Intention to
Eat Red/Processed Meat at T2).
Message-Induced Fear
To interpret the effects of baseline attitude toward red/processed
meat consumption and intention to eat red/processed meat
on message-induced fear, we used the posterior distribution
of regression coefficients (90% HDPI intervals are included in
square brackets). The comparison among message conditions
showed that in the gain message condition participants were less
scared by the message when they had a high baseline positive
attitude toward reducing RPMC (β = −0.07; [−0.14; −0.001]).
In the other message conditions message-induced fear was
instead independent of baseline attitude. In nomessage condition
was message-induced fear predicted by baseline intention to eat
red/processed meat.
Message-Induced Anger
Participants in the gain, non-loss, and loss conditions felt less
message-induced anger when they had a more positive attitude
toward reduced RPMC at time 1 (gain message condition: β
= −0.17; [−0.25; −0.10]; non-loss message condition: β =
−0.13; [−0.22; −0.03]; loss message condition: β = −0.13;
[−0.23; −0.03]). This was not the case for participants in
the non-gain message condition, who were irritated regardless
of their attitude at T1. Finally, in all message conditions no
significant relationship between receivers’ intention at T1 and
message-induced anger emerged. Thus, the feeling of anger after
message exposure was independent of baseline intention to eat
red/processed meat.
Systematic Processing
In all conditions, higher message-induced fear stimulated
systematic processing and higher message-induced anger
inhibited it, albeit with a different degree. Message-induced
fear led to systematic processing in all message conditions
(H1a), albeit more in the gain (β = 0.80 [0.17; 0.46]) and in
the loss message conditions (β = 0.91; [0.61; 1.20]) than in the
non-loss (β = 0.61; [0.33; 0.90]) and non-gain (β = 0.67; [0.37;
0.98]) conditions (RQ1a). Conversely, message-induced anger
inhibited systematic processing in all conditions (H2b), albeit
more in the gain (β = −0.92; [−1.22; −0.63]) and in the loss
conditions (β = −0.79; [−1.05; −0.72]) than in the non-loss (β
= −0.64; [−0.91; −0.38]) and the non-gain (β = −0.45; [−0.74;
−0.15]) conditions (RQ2a).
As to the other predictors of systematic processing, exposure
to gain and non-loss messages induced more systematic
processing of the message when receivers had a positive attitude
toward reduced RPMC (gain message condition: β = −0.13;
[0.002; 0.26]; non-loss message condition: β = 0.14; [0.06;
0.02]). This was not the case in the other two conditions (non-
gain message condition: β = 0.09; [−0.07; 0.24]; loss message
condition: β = 0.08; [−0.05; 0.21]). Finally, intention at T1
did not influence the degree to which participants processed
the message systematically. For a representation of the posterior
distributions of all coefficient regressions associated with the
predictors of systematic processing in each message condition,
see Figure 2. In each panel of the figure, the pink curve refers to
data of the gain message condition, the purple curve is related to
data of the non-loss message condition, the light blue curve refers
to data of the non-gain message condition, and the green curve
represents data of the loss message condition.
Heuristic Processing
In the gain, non-loss, and loss message conditions the more
participants felt anger, the more they processed the message
heuristically (H2a; gain message condition: β = 0.45; [0.15; 0.17];
non-loss message condition: β = 0.45; [0.17; 0.73]; loss message
condition: β = 0.23; [0.02; 0.45]). Conversely, in the non-
gain message condition receivers engaged in heuristic processing
regardless of their experienced anger. In all conditions the other
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FIGURE 2 | Systematic processing at time 2. Posterior distributions of the parameters associated with predictors, according to message condition.
predictors (attitude and intention at T1 and message-induced
fear) did not influence participants’ heuristic processing.
Message Evaluation
Moving on to the predictors of message evaluation, message-
induced fear positively predicted message evaluation in all
conditions (H1b), and especially in the non-gain condition (β
= 0.79; [0.51; 1.07]) (RQ1b). Conversely, message-induced anger
negatively predictedmessage evaluation in all message conditions
(H2c), and this was especially the case for the non-loss condition
(β = −0.62; [−0.91; −0.35]) (RQ2b). Moreover, in all message
conditions systematic processing positively predicted message
evaluation (H3), albeit with a different degree (RQ3; gainmessage
condition: β = 0.62; [0.48; 0.76]; non-loss message condition:
β = 0.55; [0.40; 0.71]; non-gain message condition: β = 0.58;
[0.44; 0.72]; loss message condition: β = 0.70; [0.57; 0.83]).
Heuristic processing negatively predicted message evaluation
only in the non-gain (β = −0.19; [−0.34; −0.04]) and loss (β
= −0.15; [−0.31; −0.00]) message conditions (H4; RQ4). In all
conditions the other predictors (attitude and intention at T1) did
not (or only marginally) predict receivers’ message evaluation.
Posterior distributions of each coefficient regression associated
with the predictors of message evaluation in all conditions are
shown in Figure 3. Table 2 shows the regression estimates of
message evaluation.
Attitude Toward Reduced RPMC at T2
Positive attitude at T2 was predicted by positive message
evaluation in the case of the gain (β = 0.33; [0.13; 0.53]) and the
non-loss message conditions (β = 0.34; [0.15; 0.53]), but not in
the case of the non-gain (β = 0.11; [−0.07; 0.29]) and the loss (β
= 0.18; [−0.05; 0.41]) conditions (H5; RQ5). In addition, only in
the case of gain messages did participants show a greater positive
attitude toward reduced RPMC when they also reported a lower
intention to eat red/processed meat at T1 (β = −0.30; [−0.46;
−0.14]). In the case of loss messages, attitude at T2 was only
predicted by attitude at T1 (β = 0.29; [0.27; 0.42]). Finally, in
the case of non-gain messages, attitude at T2 was not affected
by message evaluation but by higher message-induced fear (β
= 0.33; [0.00; 0.66]) and lower message-induced anger (β =
−0.43; [−0.71; −0.15]), showing that such messages influenced
attitude at T2 through an emotional processing of its content.
The posterior distributions of the parameters associated with the
predictors of attitude toward reduced RPMC, divided by message
conditions, are shown in Figure 4. Table 2 shows the regression
estimates of attitude at T2.
Intention to Eat Red/Processed Meat at T2
The posterior distributions of the parameters associated with the
predictors of the intention to eat red/processed meat, divided
by message condition, are shown in Figure 4. In all conditions,
lower intention to eat red/processedmeat at T2 was influenced by
higher attitude toward reduced RPMC at T2 (H6 and RQ6; gain
message condition: β =−0.22; [−0.34;−0.09]; non-loss message
condition: β = −0.16; [−0.30; −0.02]; loss message condition:
β = −0.12; [−0.23; −0.02]; non-gain message condition: β =
−0.12; [−0.23; −0.003]). Again in all conditions intention at T2
was related to intention at T1 (gain message condition: β = 0.40;
[0.28; 0.52]; non-loss message condition: β = 0.44; [0.30; 0.58];
loss message condition: β = 0.55; [0.43; 0.67]; non-gain message
condition: β = 0.38; [0.25; 0.51]). Finally, lower intention at T2
was influenced by higher message-induced fear both in the gain
[β = −0.36; [−0.61; −0.1]) and in the non-gain (β = −0.24;
[−0.46;−0.02]) message conditions.
In sum, the above results fully confirmed our expectation
according to which model including both cognitive (systematic
and heuristic processing) and emotional (message-induced fear
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FIGURE 3 | Message evaluation at time 2. Posterior distributions of the parameters associated with the predictors, according to message condition.
TABLE 2 | Posterior regression estimates of message evaluation and attitude at T2 in the four message conditions.
Message evaluation at T2 Attitude at T2
Message condition Gain Non-loss Non-gain Loss Gain Non-loss Non-gain Loss
Attitude at T1 −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.43* 0.17* 0.29*
Intention at T1 −0.08 −0.16 −0.10 −0.03 −0.30* −0.15 −0.36* −0.14
Message–induced fear at T2 0.40* 0.46* 0.79* 0.32* −0.31 −0.03 0.33* −0.21
Message–induced anger at T2 −0.55* −0.62* −0.52* −0.30* 0.16 0.00 −0.43* 0.00
Systematic processing at T2 0.62* 0.55* 0.58* 0.70* 0.19 −0.06 0.07 0.02
Heuristic processing at T2 −0.06 −0.09 −0.19* −0.15* −0.01 −0.02 0.08 −0.04
Message evaluation at T2 - - - - 0.33* 0.34* 0.11 0.18
*90% HPDI of the regression parameter does not include 0, thus the direct effect can be reasonably supported.
and anger) dimensions would be best suited to explain the
effects of exposure to messages on the health consequences
of red/processed meat consumption. Most of the hypothesized
relations between dimensions were therefore supported by data,
with message-induced fear positively influencing systematic
processing (H1a) and message evaluation (H1b), message-
induced anger negatively influencing systematic processing
(H2a) and message evaluation (H2b), systematic processing
positively influencing message evaluation (H3), positive message
evaluation leading to higher attitude toward RPMC reduction
(H5), and positive attitude toward reduced RPMC predicting
lower intention to eat red/processed meat (H6).
The comparison of the four message conditions on the
integrated model allowed us to answer our research questions
about the differential impact of the cognitive and emotional
dimensions after exposure to differently framed messages. First,
message-induced fear increased systematic processing in all
conditions, and especially in the loss and gainmessage conditions
(RQ1a). It also positively increased message evaluation in all
conditions, especially in the case of non-gain messages (RQ1b).
Second, message-induced anger inhibited systematic
processing in all conditions, and especially in the gain condition
(RQ2a). It also led to a more negative evaluation of the
message, especially in the non-loss condition (RQ2b). Third,
systematic processing positively influenced message evaluation
in all conditions, and especially in the loss message condition
(RQ3), while heuristic processing negatively influenced message
evaluation in the non-gain and loss message conditions (RQ4).
Fourth, in the case of gain and non-loss messages, but not in the
case of non-gain and loss messages, a more positive evaluation
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FIGURE 4 | Attitude at time 2. Posterior distributions of the parameters associated with predictors, according to message condition.
of the message (activated by systematic processing) led to higher
attitude toward reduced RPMC (RQ5), which in turn led to lower
intention to eat red/processed meat (RQ6). In regard to non-
gain messages, attitude toward reduced RPMC was positively
predicted by message-induced fear and negatively predicted by
message-induced anger, showing that such messages influenced
attitude mainly through an emotional reaction. Finally, in
regard to loss messages, attitude was instead only predicted by
baseline attitude.
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study clarify the emotional and
cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects of health messages
about reduced RPMC formulated with four different frames:
gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss.While gainmessages presented
the positive health outcomes deriving from reduced RPMC,
non-loss messages informed receivers about the avoidance of
negative health consequences through reduced RMPC, non-
gain messages provided information about the missed positive
health outcomes connected with high RPMC, and finally loss
messages focused on the negative health outcomes connected
with high RPMC. Using Bayesian analyses and comparing the
fit of different models, we found that a model including both
cognitive (systematic and heuristic processing of the messages)
and emotional dimensions (message-induced fear and message-
induced anger) leads to better understanding of how message
evaluation predicts receivers’ attitude and intention toward
red/processedmeat consumption, and has a better fit thanmodels
considering only either cognitive or emotional dimensions. We
also assessed that some of the relationships among dimensions
included in the model have different weight or even disappear in
different message frames.
The above results offer two main contributions to research
on framing effects in communication aimed to reduce RPMC.
The first contribution regards the identification of key variables
in the explanation of how cognitive and emotional mechanisms
predict receivers’ attitude and intention after being exposed to
persuasive messages aimed at inducing a reduction of RPMC.
Our hypothesized model, which was confirmed by the data,
showed that message exposure activates a chain of emotional
and cognitive reactions which end up influencing receivers’
evaluation of the messages and, in turn, subsequent attitude and
intention toward RPMC. More specifically, emotional reactions
strongly influenced cognitive processing. Fear elicited by the
messages was associated with systematic processing of the
messages themselves. This in turn led to a positive evaluation
of the message and increased positive attitude toward reducing
RPMC and a lower intention to eat red/processed meat in the
future. Conversely, anger elicited by the messages was associated
with heuristic processing of the messages, which did not lead to
any change in attitude or intention toward RPMC.
The second main contribution of our research regards the
comparative analysis of how the four different message frames
activated specific cognitive and emotional mechanisms and, in
turn, affected attitude and intention. First, we showed that
systematic processing positively influencedmessage evaluation in
all message conditions. In the case of gain and non-loss message
conditions, this positive evaluation in turn led to higher attitude
toward reduced RPMC and lower intention toward RPMC. These
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results suggest that presenting the positive consequences (gain)
or the avoidance of negative consequences (non-loss) connected
with reduced RPMC activates successful systematic processing
of the message, which in turn influences message evaluation,
attitude, and intention. The observed key role of systematic
processing and its effects are consistent with the dual-process
models of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Eagly and
Chaiken, 1993). In the case of non-gain and loss messages,
systematic process also led to a more positive evaluation of the
message, but this effect did not reverberate on a change in attitude
or intention toward RPMC. This result suggests that cognitively
processing the missed positive consequences (non-gain) or the
negative consequences (loss) associated with reduced RPMC
interrupted the persuasive effect of the message on receivers’
attitude and intention after the message evaluation. Why this
interruption occurs might be explained in the light of the role
of the emotional factors, as commented below.
We also showed how emotions influenced the systematic
processing of the message in the various message conditions. In
all conditions the perception of fear activated a fruitful chain
of message elaboration (via systematic processing and then a
positive evaluation of the message), leading to higher attitude
toward reduction and lower intention to eat red/processed
meat, albeit only in the case of gain and non-loss messages.
These results support the idea of fear as being a compelling
persuader (Tomkins, 1984), able to direct cognitive processes
(Izard, 1993). As shown by a long history of research, inducing
fear is an effective communication strategy to influence receivers’
attitude and intention, given its ability to stimulate systematic
processing based on a large number of issue-relevant thoughts
(e.g., Meijnders et al., 2001; Slater et al., 2002; Meyers-Levy
and Maheswaran, 2004; De Hoog et al., 2007). This is more
likely to happen when fear is moderate. In our study, gain
and non-loss messages very likely stimulated a moderate level
of fear, that motivated central processing. However, in the
case of gain messages the perception of fear was reduced by
participants’ positive attitude toward the reduction of their
RPMC at T1. This finding may be seen in the light of the
cognitive dissonance theory and the related confirmatory bias
(Festinger, 1962; Nickerson, 1998). Receivers who positively
evaluated reduced meat consumption but ate more meat than
recommended, and who received information about the benefits
associated with reduced consumption, were possibly confronted
with an experience of an inconsistency between their attitude and
their behavior. In this case, theymight have limited the systematic
processing of gain messages to avoid contradictory information
(confirmation bias).
Unlike the case of gain messages, in the case of non-
loss messages the perception of fear activated a successful
chain of message elaboration, regardless of receivers’ attitude
at T1. Thus, non-loss messages can be considered as the most
efficient frame in inducing attitude and intention via a fruitful
emotional, and then cognitive message processing that leads
to attitude and intention change. This promising effect of the
non-loss message can be partially attributed to loss aversion
and negativity bias (Kühberger et al., 1999). Proposing the
avoidance of negative outcomes directs the attention to the
possible negative consequences of one’s behavior and triggers
some fear. Consequently, the acquisition of fearful and negative
information induces greater information processing than does
positive information, as suggested by the negativity bias theory
(Rozin and Royzman, 2001). A greater elaboration may then
induce greater attitude and intention change. This finding is
consistent with a prior study by Carfora et al. (2020b), also
comparing gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss messages, and
showing that non-loss messages were indeed the most effective
messages, apt to involve and persuade the majority of receivers,
independent of their prior beliefs.
In the case of loss messages, the elicitation of fear led
to systematic processing and a positive evaluation of the
message content. Relying on a negative bias, the acquisition
of negative information led to greater information processing
than the acquisition of positive information. However, the
elaboration of loss messages did not converge on higher attitude
and lower intention toward red/processed meat consumption,
probably because it activated high levels of fear that in turn
induced resistance to the message (Witte, 1992; Ruiter et al.,
2001). The loss-framed messages were therefore not effective
in impacting on attitude and intention at T2. These findings
contribute to further clarify when message-induced fear becomes
counterproductive (Popova, 2014). In the case of loss messages,
fear probably acted as a cue for people to use defensive strategies,
to reduce potential emotional distress associated with the read
messages (Witte, 1992; Ruiter et al., 2001).
Finally, in the case of non-gain messages a further different
effect of induced fear emerged. Fear directly predicted higher
attitude toward reduced RPMC and lower intention to eat
red/processed meat, regardless of systematic processing of the
message. Probably, the non-gain frame scared successfully
participants, not activating defensive strategies but also
bypassing systematic processing. This latest point may be
counterproductive long-term in regard to the persuasiveness
of this message frame because, according to the dual-process
model, only when receivers activate systematic processing is
the message internalized, resulting in a longer and more stable
attitude change (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).
Anger also played a relevant role in influencing systematic
processing and evaluation of the messages, but in a negative
direction. This result is coherent with previous evidence
according to which anger mobilizes cognitive mechanics for the
purpose of defending oneself, and these include resistance to
a message inducing anger (Brown, 2001). It is also consistent
with previous research showing that angry people tend to use
heuristics to process information (Moons and Mackie, 2007).
Similar to what happened for fear, in the non-gain message
condition (and not in the other conditions) anger was directly
related to a negative attitude toward reducing RPMC at T2.
Our research has several limitations. First, in the light of the
existing gap between intentions to perform a certain behavior
and its actual performance (Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2014),
the lack of a measurement of the actual behavior is the most
important limitation of the present study. Second, our sample
was restricted to Italian people, thus the data may not be
generalized to other countries. Third, the measures used in our
questionnaire lacked manipulation checks. Fourth, we cannot
exclude the risk of self-selection bias, as participants were invited
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for a study on public communication. Fifth, we did not adopt
an open-science approach by pre-registering our hypotheses and
analysis plan. Finally, participants were exposed only once to
short messages on health outcomes, thus we were able to assess
only small and short-term effects. Messages delivered over a
longer time span and with repeated exposure (e.g., Caso and
Carfora, 2017; Carfora et al., 2018) could yield larger and long-
term effects on recipients’ attitudes and intentions.
Future research should carefully retest our preliminary results
on the mechanisms involved in processing messages on RPMC
formulated with different frames, sending messages over a
longer period of time. Moreover, future studies could verify
whether gain-, non-loss-, non-gain-, and loss-framed messages
systematically differ in the level of positive emotions they
engender, and whether message-induced positive emotions are
linked directly to persuasive outcomes. Future studies could also
verify whether the cognitive and emotional processing of gain,
non-loss, non-gain, and loss messages are the same when the
presented outcomes are different from the ones presented here.
We cannot exclude that there might be systematic differences
among messages that propose the same behavior to obtain
different outcomes. For example, the reduction of RPMC to
avoid negative environmental consequences could be felt as
too distant in time and thus non-loss frames could resonate
as less convincing than was the case in the present study.
Similarly, a close consideration of how health messages focused
on different recommended behavior (e.g., sugary food and junk
food consumption) which may align with one frame type over
another would be useful. Future studies could also deepen
our understanding of the effects of the four types of message
frames considering their fit with individual characteristics, such
as the utilitarian or hedonic approach toward food purchasing
(Lombardi et al., 2017), or consumers’ trust toward the health
recommendation provided by public authorities (Carfora et al.,
2019c; Cembalo et al., 2019).
CONCLUSION
To sum up, in the present study we validated a model explaining
how messages differing according to the regulatory framework
model (i.e., gain, non-loss, non-gain, and lossmessages) influence
receivers’ evaluation of the messages, as well as attitude and
intention toward red/processed meat consumption. Our results
respond to the need for theoretical advancement in the area of the
underlying mechanisms elicited by message framing (Rothman
et al., 2020) and show the plausibility of a model including
both the cognitive and emotional dimensions elicited by message
exposure. Starting from the assumption that both cognitive and
emotional mechanisms underlie the persuasiveness of a message,
we showed that a model of persuasion that articulates how
message-induced negative emotions may influence information
processing and subsequent attitude and intention. In the case
of gain and especially non-loss messages, systematic processing,
supported by a moderate level of fear, strongly contributed to
the persuasive effect of the messages. Instead, the effects of loss
and non-gain messages were more determined by emotional
reactions and less mediated by systematic processing, ending up
with reduced persuasive power.
In conclusion, our study introduced and tested an inclusive
reference model to explain the effects of message frames based on
the presence/absence of positive/negative outcomes of expected
behaviors and aimed at changing the attitudes and behaviors
of the receivers. It will be up to future research to further
investigate the possibility of applying this model to messages
aimed at modifying attitudes and intentions other than the one
investigated here, as well as verifying if and how the differences
in the mechanisms studied here also depend on individual
differences among receivers.
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